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COMMENTS
ATTORNEYS-ADMISSION TO THE BAR DENIED FOR REFUSAL TO ANSWER
INQUIRY INTO MEMBERSHIP IN COMMUNIST PARTY
In re Anastaplo, 121 N.E.2d 826 (Ill. 1954)
Petitioner passed the Illinois bar examination and applied for a
certificate of approval from the district Committee on Character and
Fitness., The committee denied approval of the application because
petitioner refused to disclose2 to the committee whether he was a mem-
ber of the Communist Party. Petitioner filed a motion for admission
with the Supreme Court of Illinois,3 contending that the committee
had abused its discretion and violated his right of free speech under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by inquiring
into his political affiliations. The Supreme Court denied admission,
holding that the committee was justified in refusing to approve peti-
tioner's application because of his refusal to disclose whether he was
a member of the Communist Party, and that the committee's action
did not violate petitioner's right of free speech.4
In all states the moral character and general fitness of applicants
for the bar must be approved prior to their admission to practice.5 Al-
though in some states the applicant need only submit affidavits as
proof of good character,6 the majority of states provide for a char-
acter investigation of applicants either by the bar examining board or
1. ILL. REv. STAT. C. 110, § 259.58 (1951), provides:
Section IX. Committee on Character and Fitness
1.... The Supreme Court shall appoint a Committee on Character and
Fitness in each of the Appellate Court Districts of this State....
2. Before admission to the bar, each applicant shall be passed upon by
the Committee in his district as to his character and moral fitness .... Each
applicant shall appear before the Committee of his district ... and shall
furnish the Committee such evidence of his moral character and good citi-
zenship as in the opinion of the Committee would justify his admission to
the bar.
3. If the Committee is of the opinion that the applicant is of approved
character and moral fitness, it shall so certify to the Board of Law Examin-
ers and the applicant shall thereafter be entitled to admission to the bar.
2. The applicant based his refusal to answer upon the irrelevancy of the com-
mittee's inquiry and did not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. It
has been held, however, that an attorney cannot claim such privilege when his
conduct is being investigated by a court. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248
N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
3. As part of their inherent power to regulate the practice of law, courts, in
a proper situation, may overrule the decision of the examining committee. A mo-
tion for admission to the supreme court of the state is a proper manner in which
to present the question. See, e.g., Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 281 Pac.
1018 (1929).
4. In re Anastaplo, 121 N.E.2d 826 (II. 1954).
5. RTLEs FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (WVest Publishing Co. 33d ed. 1953).
6. Shafroth, Character Investigation, in BAR EXAMINATIONS AND REQUIRD-
MENTS FOR AD.MISSION TO THE BAR 251, 257 (1952).
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by a separate character committee.7 The board or committee, in its
investigation, may inquire into any matter that is relevant to the de-
termination of the applicant's character and general fitness for the
practice of law.8 The applicant is required to disclose any relevant
matter, such as a prior conviction or indictment,, previous disbarment
for professional misconduct, 0 or personal misconduct which affects
his fitness to practice.2 The recommendation made by the character
committee or examining board on the basis of its inquiry is subject to
judicial review, but is usually considered to be conclusive in the ab-
sence of a clear abuse of discretion."
In a number of states an inquiry into the applicant's loyalty is
included as part of the character investigation. 3 The petitioner in
the principal case, in refusing to answer the committee's inquiry, as-
serted that his relation to the Communist Party -was irrelevant to
the determination of his fitness to practice law. Courts have held,
however, that an individual may be denied admission 24 or disbarred
from practice's because of his participation in an organization which
advocates the use of unlawful force to effectuate social change."
7. For a listing of the various character requirements and investigative pro-
cedures, see Jackson, Character Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 20
FoRD. L. REv. 305 (1951).
8. The inquiry into the moral character of applicants for admission is broader
in scope than in a disbarment proceeding. In re Stepsay, 15 Cal. 2d 71, 98 P.2d
489 (1940). The character committee's task of ascertaining character and gen-
eral fitness apparently does not include questions regarding the scholastic ability
of the applicant. Application of Brennan, 230 App. Div. 218, 243 N.Y. Supp.
705 (2d Dep't 1930).
9. Spears v. State Bar of California, 211 Cal. 183, 294 Pac. 697 (1930); In re
Kristeller, 154 App. Div. 556, 139 N.Y. Supp. 64 (1st Dep't 1913); State ex rel.
Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 189 Wis. 457, 207 N.W. 709 (1926).
10. In re Mash, 28 Cal. App. 692, 153 Pac. 961 (1915); State Bar v. Riccardi,
53 Nev. 128, 294 Pac. 537 (1931).
11. In re Wells, 36 Cal. App. 785, 172 Pac. 93 (1918); In re Moshkow, 250
App. Div. 780, 294 N.Y. Supp. 474 (2d Dep't 1937).
12. To show abuse of discretion the applicant would probably have to prove
prejudice on the part of the examiners, lack of fair procedure during the inquiry,
or a decision manifestly contrary to the evidence. See, e.g., Higgins v. Hartford
County Bar, 111 Conn. 47, 149 At]. 415 (1930); In re Frank, 293 11. 263, 127
N.E. 640 (1920); In re Hughey, 62 Nev. 498, 156 P.2d 733 (1945).
13. For a comprehensive survey of the actual inquiries made by bar committees
during their character investigation of applicants, see Brown and Fassett, Loy-
alty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. oF CHL L. RE%. 480 (1953).
14. Application of Cassidy, 268 App. Div. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (2d Dep't
1944), aff'd 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947) (member of the Christian Front
denied admission for advocating the unlawful use of force against subversive
elements).
15. Margolis's Case, 269 Pa. 206, 112 Atl. 478 (1921); In re Smith, 133 Wash.
145, 233 Pac. 288 (1925). But cf. In re Clifton, 33 Idaho 614, 196 Pac. 670
(1921).
16. It has not been determined whether mere membership in the Communist
Party would disqualify the individual for the practice of law, as the courts have
based their decisions on the overt activity by the person involved. See notes 13,
14 supra. See, however, Martin v. Law Society of British Columbia 3 D.L.IL
173, 195 (1950), in which the applicant, an admitted member of the 6 ommunist
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While it may be conceded that an inquiry into an applicant's political
affiliations ordinarily would be irrelevant, an inquiry regarding an
applicant's membership in the Communist Party, whose conspira-
torial purpose is well recognized, 7 would appear to be particularly
relevant to the determination of his fitness to practice law. s
Once the relevancy of the inquiry is established, the applicant can-
not invoke his right of free speech under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to defeat such inquiry. In Garner v.
Board of Public lVorks,19 the United States Supreme Court upheld
the discharge of municipal employees because of their refusal to file
affidavits, as required by ordinance, 20 stating whether they had ever
been members of the Communist Party. It was indicated in the
Garner case, as in the principal case,21 that the only constitutional
question was whether the individual could be required to disclose his
Communist affiliations in answer to relevant inquiry; whether his
disclosure of past or present membership in the Communist Party
then would be a justification for denying the individual his chosen
occupation is a quite different problem. 2 While the Garner case in-
volved municipal employees, the requirement of loyalty is equally
applicable to the lawyer, who occupies a quasi-public position and is
obligated by his oath to uphold the Constitution"
It is well established that a lawyer, upon admission to practice,
Party, claimed that he personally was opposed to the use of violence or force to
achieve the party's goals. The couit denied admission, saying:
If a man joins a body that is in effect conspiring against the Government
he goes beyond mere opinion; his very joining is an overt act.
17. See, for example, Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in American Communica-
tions Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 424 (1950), where the Communist Party is
characterized as a "revolutionary junta" whose purposes are foreign to our con-
stitutional system of government.
18. The American Bar Association has recommended that each state require
each member of the bar to file an affidavit stating whether he is, or ever has been,
a member of an organization supporting the overthrow of the government by
unconstitutional means. Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 36 A.B.A.J. 948,
972 (1950).
19. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
20. The ordinance also required that the individual take an oath that he had
not, within the previous five years, advised, advocated or taught the overthrow of
the government by unlawful means. The majority of the Court also upheld this
prevision as against the claim by the petitioners that it was an ex post facto law.
Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 721 (1951).
21. In re Anastaplo, 121 N.E.2d 826, 831 (IlL 1954)
22. Certainly past membership in the Communist Party could, be justified on
the basis of the applicant's innocence of its conspiratorial nature. It is doubtful,
however, whether present membership could be considered as innocent, in view
of the Communist Control Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 637, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 886
(Aug. 24, 1954), which stripped the Communist Party of any of the rights of
recognized political parties.
23. In In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945), the Supreme Court of the United
States upheld the Illinois Supreme Court's denial of admission to a conscientious
objector. The Court reasoned that the applicant could not conscientiously take
the lawyer's oath to uphold the constitution when he was unwilling, because of
his religious scruples, to bear arms if required to do so.
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becomes an officer of the court whose duty is to exercise a high degree
of candor in all his relations with the court. The principal case has
adopted a sound policy, for, regardless of whether the petitioner was,
in fact, a member of the Communist Party,24 information regarding
his membership in the Party is clearly relevant to his fitness to
practice law.
CRIMINAL LAW-NEW TEST OF INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
Defendant, who had a long history of mental illness, was accused of
housebreaking." At the trial, his only defense was insanity at the time
the act was committed. His conviction was reversed on appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which adopted, as
a new test of insanity in that jurisdiction, the rule that "an accused
is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or mental defect."2 The court retained the District's
rule that the prosecution must prove the mental responsibility of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt.3
There are two principal tests utilized in determining the insanity of
the defendant in criminal cases. In England and twenty-nine states,'
the only standard of mental responsibility is the "right-wrong" test,
made famous in M'Naghten's case,5 which absolves the defendant of
criminal responsibility if he did not "know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
24. There was no affirmative evidence in the principal case that the petitioner
had ever been a member of the Communist Party. During the investigation by
the committee, however, the petitioner had expressed his belief in the doctrine of
revolution and the right of the people to overthrow the government by force of
arms, if necessary. The court, however, based its decision upon the petitioner's
refusal to disclose whether he was a Communist, and not upon the statements
made by the petitioner during the committee's inquiry.
1. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1801 (1951).
2. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-875 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The test
has subsequently been rejected by the United States Court of Military Appeals.
United States V. Smith, 23 U.S.L. Week 2321 (U.S. Ct. of Mil. App. Dec. 30,
1954).
3. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
4. See WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 51 (1954). Mis-
souri is one of these states; see State v. McGee, 361 Mo. 309, 234 S.W.2d 587
'(1950).
.5. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 10 C. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
Daniel M'Naghten, was found not guilty by reason of insanity for the killing of
Edward Drummond, secretary to Robert Peel, then prime minister of England.
The furor caused by the verdict, resulted in. a debate. in the House of Lords in
which leading judges in England were asked questions regarding the law with
respect to insanity. Their answers were not new law-but, were merely a recita-
tion of what the law in England was at that time., See HALL, PINCIPLES OF'
CRIMINAL LAw 480 (1947).
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